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Abstract
We review practical advice on decision-making during computer se-
curity incident response. Scope includes standards from the IETF, ISO,
FIRST, and the US intelligence community. To focus on human decision-
making, the scope is the evidence collection, analysis, and reporting phases
of response. The results indicate both strengths and gaps. A strength is
available advice on how to accomplish many specific tasks. However, there
is little guidance on how to prioritize tasks in limited time or how to in-
terpret, generalize, and convincingly report results. Future work should
focus on these gaps in explication and specification of decision-making
during incident analysis.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this literature review is to identify the structure of human
decision-making during computer-security incident response (shortened as in-
cident response if the usage is unambiguous) and identify the existing research
programs that underpin the study of each element of the decision-making struc-
ture. The utility of such a literature review is to identify opportunities to
expand research programs, as well as to identify loci of research programs best
strengthened by interdisciplinary work or requiring interfield theories.
Incident response is an attractive topic because it anchors the whole field
of information security. When information security is not responding to an in-
cident, it is either preparing for one or learning from past incident responses.1
Preparation and learning are each complex and independent. However, their
crux is incident response. We restrict our focus to human-centric decision mak-
ing as opposed to automated or machine-learning techniques. Such automation
is clearly crucial to incident response. However, deciding what automation to
build and use remains a human decision, as does how to interpret and act on
results.
1Prevention of future incidents may fruitfully be discussed as independent from incident
response, but in practice prevention techniques are almost all adapted from the lessons learned
after responding to an incident.
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Information security is important, yet breaches are usually detected months
after they occur (Verizon, 2015). Professionals suggest judging whether an
organization has a good security posture by their incident response capabilities
(Shimeall and Spring, 2014, ch. 15).2 The question we address in this review
is: how do incident responders make decisions during an investigation?
Successful guidance on this question improves incident response, and thereby
all of information security. However, the question is deceptively simple, and the
use of ‘how’ is ambiguous. More specifically, we want a satisfactory process by
which incident responders generate and prioritize questions to ask, a satisfactory
process of answering these questions under time constraints, and a satisfactory
process for how these answers lead to decisions. In summary, there is ample
advice on what questions to ask and how to answer a given specific question,
but little on how to prioritize questions or interpret results. Therefore, we
identify a significant lacuna in the existing literature on decision making and
evidence evaluation during incident response. We suggest some directions for
filling this gap use mathematical modeling and philosophy of science.
The immediate challenge of this literature review is an explosion of scope.
The scope is too broad for at least two reasons: the topic is of broad application
with many sub-parts, and the academic literature is not the only relevant source.
Practitioners are a necessary source if the review is to adequately capture the
state of the art. Besides simply increasing the volume of publications to review,
information security practitioners do not publish with the same reliability nor
norms as customary for input to an academic literature review. This variability
makes it difficult to evaluate contributions on a single appraisal strategy.
We approach this problem in the two broad parts. The first part covers
scope and problem definition. Section 2.1 defines the term computer-security
incident response, and which aspects are in scope for our discussion. Section 2.2
defines the scope in terms of publication venues included in the review. Section 3
provides evidence that no literature review with similar scope and goals has been
conducted. Section 4 defines our method for reviewing the state of decision-
making recommendations during computer-security incident response.
The second part covers results and proposed research. Section 5 provides
the results of the incident response decision-making literature review. The first
four subparts cover each of the four venues in scope, and Section 5.5 reports
the evaluation of documents cited by those documents from the search results
that are evaluated to be relevant. Section 6 critically analyzes the results of
the reviews. Section 7 suggests gaps and some broad directions that might be
followed to begin to fill them.
2See also: “The question you must accept is not whether security incid-
ents will occur, but rather how quickly they can be identified and resolved.”
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/prepare-for-the-inevitable-security-incident/
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2 Scope
This section limits the scope of the literature review in two distinct aspects: the
definition of the topic and the publication venues. We will restrict the defin-
ition of Computer Security Incident Response (CSIR) to three subtasks dur-
ing investigation: evidence collection, analysis, and reporting. We will restrict
publication venues to relevant international standards and academic literature
that is referenced therein. Specifically, the search venues will be the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), the International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO),3 Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), and
documents understood to represent the United States of America (US) intelli-
gence community (IC).
As far as possible, we will use standard definitions for terms, preferring
global, consensus, freely-available definitions. Explicitly, in order of preference,
the IETF, ISO, and FIRST. This ordering is based on the extent of consensus (the
IETF membership is broader than FIRST) and the openness of the definitions.
Otherwise, the choice of established definitions for jargon is primarily for clarity,
and to compress the discussion; we assume familiarity with the terms in the IETF
Internet Security Glossary (Shirey, 2007).
The scope is not the traditional academic venues. The operational reason is
to focus on what incident responders actually do. Ideally this would take the
form of first-hand accounts; however, cybersecurity is a sensitive topic. Chatham
House Rules4 and non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) abound in the discipline;
these norms within the security community further frustrate any usual academic
publication expectations. It would be impossible to evaluate the selection bias
or outright deception within studies. The incident response standards at least
form an honest baseline of what is expected of a competent practitioner. The
assumption is that this review applies to competent practitioners, where com-
petent is defined by consensus among practitioners and codified in the standards.
We do not empirically address the extent to which competence is common. Due
to the community norms of secrecy, norms documented by Sundaramurthy et al.
(2014), a comprehensive evaluation seems impractical.
Section 3 provides evidence that the academic literature does not systematic-
ally cover our scope. The method to justify this is a search through two common
sources of literature reviews, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Com-
puting Surveys and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
Security and Privacy “systematization of knowledge” papers. In summary, no
relevant surveys have been published on human decision-making during CSIR
analysis. While the reason why is unclear, the task is not made easier by the
natural secrecy of practitioners.
3Although ISO standards are only available for a fee, the terms and definitions as used in
the relevant standards (the 27000 series) are freely available.
4Chatham House Rules indicates a situation in which the information or content of a
meeting, discussion, or presentation may be disclosed but the source of the information may
not be identified, implicitly or explicitly. This request is made by the speaker prior to disclosing
the information.
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A further consideration in focusing on standards as the starting point is
simply to prevent an explosion of documents to review. A cursory Google
Scholar search for “computer security incident response” and “digital forensic
investigation” each return about 2,000 results. Alternatively, searches in the
ACM Guide to Computing Literature and IEEE Xplore databases for “computer
security incident response” each return 20-25 results (both on Sep 1, 2017).
Many of these results are obscure, and for those that are not it is challenging
to evaluate their operational impact. Going straight to the standards bypasses
this question of impact – the remit and authority of standards is explicit.
Finally, one author draws on six years of personal experience working at a
research center interacting with a variety of practicing incident responders.
2.1 Scope—Topic
The first task is to situate computer-security incident response within a context
of what it excludes and what falls under it. Incident response is a subspecies of
business continuity planning or continuity of operations. Continuity planning
may be a response to man-made or natural events, and either physical or digital
events. A military invasion is a man-made, physical event; a hurricane is a
natural, physical event. Computer-security incident response is only in response
to security incidents that are primarily digital, where a security incident is
something “contrary to system policy” (Shirey, 2007). Thus, accidents of all
kinds are out of scope; though distinguishing apparent accidents from malicious
acts is included. Intentional physical destruction of computing resources is also
out of scope of computer-security incident response (Brownlee and Guttman,
1998).
Narrowing the focus further, incident response is a task within incident man-
agement.5 CERT/CC definitions of incident management (Alberts et al., 2004;
Mundie et al., 2014) locate incident response as independent from activities
such as preparation, improving defences, training, financing, and lessons learnt.
Mundie et al. (2014) surveys practices including those by CERT/CC and ISO; six
tasks are included as part of incident response: monitoring, detection, evidence
collection, analysis, reporting, and recovery. These six tasks form the core topic
of this survey of incident response.
5The term “incident management” does not appear in IETF documents consistently. Tram-
mell (2012a) describes Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) (Danyliw et
al., 2007) as a protocol for “exchange of incident management data,” but the term “incident
management” does not appear again in Trammell (2012a), and not even once in Danyliw et al.
(2007). ISO/IEC (2016) defines “information security incident management” as “exercise of
a consistent and effective approach to the handling of information security incidents.” FIRST
does not provide a definition itself, but FIRST (2017) recommends the CERT R© Coordin-
ation Center (CERT/CC) documentation on incident management. Trammell and Danyliw
both worked at CERT/CC, so this is probably the source of the informal reference in the IETF
documents. The CERT/CC phases are consistent with the ISO/IEC (2016) phases of plan and
prepare; detection and reporting; assessment and decision; responses; and lessons learnt. We
prefer the CERT/CC definitions as they are public (vice the ISO standards), and recommended
by FIRST (thus in scope of using global, consensus-driven definitions).
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The human-centric decisions that are elements of these six incident response
tasks vary in importance. Analysis, reporting, and recovery are almost wholly
human-driven. Monitoring is almost wholly automated, while detection and
evidence collection are a mixture. Where detection is automated, say in an
intrusion detection system (IDS),6 it is out of scope. Decisions about what
detection rules to implement in an IDS are part of the preparation or improving
defences phases of incident management, as a result of lessons learnt, and thus
are also out of scope. Actual human intrusion detection is rare, and when it
occurs is usually the result of analysis during incident response to some other,
automatically-detected incident. Therefore, the focus on human-driven incident
response investigation excludes monitoring and detection.
The IETF (Brownlee and Guttman, 1998; Shirey, 2007) and CERT/CC define
neither “investigation” nor “forensics” in relation to the incident management
process. ISO/IEC (2015c) places investigation as the centrepiece of incident
management, where the principles of incident management are to “give guidance
on the investigation of, and preparation to investigate, information security
incidents” ISO/IEC (2016, §0). In this way, ISO uses “investigation” as a near-
synonym to “response” in the IETF and FIRST literature.
The use of ‘incident’ emphasizes that the investigation is oriented towards
the violation of some policy, possibly but not necessarily a law. Thus, modelling
or analysing online crime is an investigation, and so is IT staff looking into
a usage policy violation. Incident response or investigation is entwined with
cybersecurity because one essential aspect of a defence strategy is feedback from
investigation to ‘preparation’ and ‘protection’ (Alberts et al., 2004). However,
detailed discussion of preparation and protection is placed out of scope.
Incident response, per IETF and FIRST, explicitly includes remediation. ISO
(ISO/IEC, 2015c) treats remediation and response as separate from investiga-
tion. In determining scope, we follow ISO and exclude recovery. Note that both
sets of standards agree that clear reporting is the proper output of incident
analysis, and any recovery follows reporting. However, it does seem clear that
recovery follows a different decision process than analysis, and the two should
be treated separately. Within the six tasks identified within incident response,
three are left in scope:
• evidence collection
• analysis
• reporting
These three seem too tightly coupled to separate, and are described consistently
across the international standards organizations.
For each of these three topics, the concern is primarily with how an individual
analyst makes decisions during these three phases. What tool or what language
the analyst or investigator uses to make these choices is not germane and is
6Shirey (2007) refers to Bace and Mell (2001) for the definition and guidelines for IDS,
which has been superseded by Scarfone and Mell (2007).
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out of scope. This is not a review of available security tools, platforms, or
data exchange formats. The goal is to survey how analysts enumerate options,
evaluate choices, generalize results, and justify these steps.
2.2 Scope—Publication Venues
Incident response and investigation includes professional and business aspects;
therefore the scope of viable sources incident response practices cannot justifi-
ably be limited to academic sources. As Spring et al. (2017) documents, the
science of security is an unsettled area of research rather than an area with
anything like standards. In fact, traditional academic publication venues con-
tain little if anything about day-to-day incident response practices; academics
do not do incident response themselves. Sundaramurthy et al. (2014) seems to
mark the first anthropological study of a Computer Security Incident Response
Team (CSIRT)7 members and their attitudes, but this literature is not about the
actual process of incident response; that is covered in the professional literature.
Therefore, to understand current incident response practices the scope of the
review is internationally-relevant standards and whatever literature is referenced
therein. The history of standards as its own industry is complex in its own right
(Spring, 2011). The Internet and IT standards are formed by heterogeneous
processes by a wide variety of actors (Oksala et al., 1996). Security-relevant
standards are beginning to be seen as having their own unique requirements,
distinct from IT standards generally (Kuhlmann et al., 2016). However, it is a
separate project to analyse how CSIR standards have come to be. The standards
in this review are taken as-is, with the understanding that any interpretations
should be made cautiously because the standards may not cleanly fit in to
existing studies of how and why other IT standards are created. More than
other IT standards, CSIR standards are likely a codification of tacit practitioner
knowledge (Nightingale, 2009).
The scope of publication venues is limited to ISO, IETF, FIRST, and the US
intelligence community (IC). This choice is based on what organizations are
relevant in influencing or describing international incident response practices,
which is in turn based in the history of the governance of the Internet. We
mitigate potential over-restriction of focus by including any documents cited by
standards publications. The reasoning for selecting these organizations specific-
ally is as follows.
ISO and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) are the author-
itative technology standards makers (Oksala et al., 1996, p. 11). The US fed-
eral government plays a dominant role in Internet development and standards,
through the original Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) development
under the US Department of Defense (DoD) and subsequent stewardship under
the Department of Commerce.8
7CSIRT is the general term, and will be used unless referring to a specific organization.
8Two important sub-parts of Commerce are Internet governance by the National Telecom-
munications and Information Administration and standards by National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).
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ISO is de dicto where one looks for international standards. Each nation-state
is allowed to have one member is ISO, namely the official national standards body
representing all the industry-based bodies in each country. It is a federation of
federations, representing a multitude of industries. ISO standardizes things like
the two-letter country codes (which have been adopted as Domain Name System
(DNS) top-level domains), paper sizes, and credit cards. The ITU and their
CIRT program9 seems promising in name; however, their website publishes little
besides an events list. It appears that content is provided by FIRST members,
companies, or other consultancies; the ITU does not produce its own incident
response materials or standards. This leaves only ISO in scope of the potential
authoritative international standards bodies.
On the other hand, the IETF is the de facto place to go for international
Internet standards because, for all intents and purposes, its standards are the
Internet. The IETF “doesn’t recognize kings—only running code” and creates
more pragmatic, open (freely-available) standards (Oksala et al., 1996, p. 12).
Open standards happen to have won out on the Internet; IETF standards like
Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), DNS, and Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) underpin every Internet connection. For a background
history of how the precursor to the IETF came to this dominant role, see Hafner
and Lyon (1998). The other main open-standards body is the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C), which standardizes Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
and Extensible Markup Language (XML), for example. W3C stays narrowly
focused on web standards, and although this includes important web security
considerations, W3C does not work on incident management, so we mark the
group as out of scope.
FIRST is not part of this longer information and communications techno-
logy (ICT) standards history. It was formed in 1990 specifically to coordinate
among and represent the interests of CSIRTs globally. FIRST’s mission includes
developing and sharing best practices, as well as creating and expanding incident
response teams (FIRST, 2003). FIRST is the one and only global organization
representing those who do human-centric incident response tasks. FIRST’s work
with United Nations (UN) agencies like the ITU also testifies to its global influ-
ence. It is naturally included as in-scope.
There are three organizations one might consider naturally in scope that are
excluded. These are EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA),
NIST, and the US DoD. However, within the gray area between NIST and the US
intelligence community, we identify a fourth set of de facto standards.
ENISA is specifically focused on CSIRTs and information security. The European
Union (EU) makes available an independent evaluation of ENISA’s limited activ-
ities.10 Its function is coordination and capacity building among EU-member
CSIRTs and to provide advice on some EU policies. While EU directive 2016/1148
will increase ENISA’s statutory powers when it comes into effect in November
2018, at this point ENISA has little authority to force member states to take its
9http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/Organizational-Structures.aspx
10“Annual ex-post evaluation of ENISA activities” https://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa/annual-ex-post-evaluation-of-enisa-activities
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advice. In the scheme of incident response practices, ENISA – founded in 2004
– is quite young. ENISA documents are informational, the one document inter-
facing with EU standards is an extended definition of the term “cybersecurity”
and what EU work is done related to it (Brookson et al., 2015). Oddly, the docu-
ment does not even mention incident response as an area within cybersecurity,11
so it seems safe to leave ENISA out of scope.
NIST is a difficult organization to place in or out of scope. It is part of
the Department of Commerce, and so has loose ties to the remaining Internet
stewardship invested in the National Telecommunications and Information Ad-
ministration. Strictly, NIST merely sets policies for how the US federal civilian
government secures its IT infrastructure and responds to incidents (Cichonski et
al., 2012). This Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) policy
responsibility is a part of NIST’s larger role of “advancing measurement science,
standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve
our quality of life” (U.S. Dept of Commerce, 2017). Through this role, NIST
standardized AES, which is the de facto global standard encryption algorithm.
NIST documents and standards are also cited by the IETF, ISO, and FIRST, el-
evating certain NIST work from a national to international status. We shall
consider NIST generally out of scope; however, many NIST publications will be
considered as works cited by the international standards organizations.
There are two US federal government units that do not fall under NIST’s
authority – the DoD and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These two
organizations have not published incident response standards as openly as NIST
or these other standards organizations. The DoD does have other cybersecurity
documents that are tangentially relevant. The Orange Book (Brand, 1985),
which evaluates trusted computing platforms, is relevant background material
for incident responders.
The questions the DoD and its sub-agency the National Security Agency
(NSA) have raised around whether cybersecurity is, broadly, a science (see, e.g.,
Galison (2012), Katz (2016) and MITRE (2010)) could inform evidence evalu-
ation in incidence response because evaluating evidence properly is a primary
scientific activity. While these DoD projects ask the right questions about sci-
ence to help with incident response, they have generally concluded security is
not (yet) a science, and so there is little advice. Spring et al. (2017) argues
this conclusion is ill-founded and excessively pessimistic. However, the relevant
point for this review is that the science of security literature does not advise
CSIR.
While the main part of the DoD is out of scope, the intelligence community
aspects of the US federal government do provide adequate documents. The DoD
and CIA are generally not forthcoming with more conventional descriptions of
their incident response practice. However, given that NIST is not authoritative
over the IC, one would expect them to develop their own standard practices.
Documents related to the practice of the US IC are occasionally published, with
11Despite the fact that ENISA sponsored an informational document on evidence gathering
aimed at increasing understanding between CSIRTs and law enforcement (Anderson, 2015).
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IC attribution either explicit or implicit. Three such documents are relevant to
evidence collection and analysis in incident investigation, forming what is es-
sentially a de facto standard. The first is a textbook published by the CIA and
used to train intelligence analysts (Heuer, 1999) whose methods are applicable
to CSIR. The second is a pair of documents, the kill chain model of computer
network attacks (Hutchins et al., 2011) and the diamond model of intrusion ana-
lysis (Caltagirone et al., 2013). Unlike the textbook, these documents are not
explicitly acknowledged as standard analysis methods within the defence and
intelligence communities. However, the diamond model paper is published by
the DoD publisher, the Defense Technical Information Center.12 The diamond
model builds on the kill chain. Given that Lockheed Martin, a US defence
contractor, published the kill chain, it seems the papers are from overlapping
communities. Although it is tenuous to term three documents a ‘standard,’ it is
clear from the content that they come from a practitioner community and are
one of the clearest available expressions of intrusion investigation methods pub-
licly available. Therefore, it is necessary to place them in scope for discussion.
The US intelligence agencies exercise out-sized international influence. The
US is part of an intelligence sharing alliance known as the five eyes, which
includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. As the
biggest partner in this alliance by far, what the US intelligence practitioners
do is probably accommodated, if not directly copied, by the other countries’
services.
US military influence goes beyond the five eyes. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is the biggest alliance the US leads, with 28 other coun-
tries. NATO intelligence is also presumably influenced by five eyes, as Canada
and the UK also play a big role. The US tends to supply logistics and intel-
ligence support in its alliances, so intelligence standards are likely to influence
allies. Other locations which cooperate extensively with the US include Israel,
South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. By virtue of these alliances, it is reas-
onable to assume that intelligence professionals in all these places are relatively
closely aligned with US intelligence standards. These alliances end up including
most of the global military and intelligence spending. Essentially only China
and Russia are excluded, and the two of them account for 15-20% of global
military spending. Thus, although there are rather few IC documents, and they
are focused on the US, they should provide information about how a large swath
of such practitioners make decisions.
In summary, this review will include the IETF, ISO, FIRST, and available in-
telligence community documents as in-scope publication venues for incident in-
vestigation standards of practice for evidence collection, analysis, and reporting.
The review will exclude the ITU, W3C, ENISA and US federal civilian govern-
ment departments and agencies as out of scope due to either limited applicable
content or limited jurisdiction. The most borderline organization is NIST, which
occasionally has standards canonized by the in-scope venues; the review will
only include those NIST standards cited or adopted explicitly by the four in-
12See http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA586960.
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scope venues.
Section 4.1 describes the method for determining which standards are relev-
ant within these venues.
3 Novelty
This section provides a brief structured survey of the survey literature in order
to demonstrate that our intended scope, as defined in Section 2, has not been
previously surveyed. Lack of related surveys in two academic venues provide
evidence: IEEE Security and Privacy Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) pa-
pers and ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) journal. All 35 extant SoK papers
(as of August 1, 2017) are appraised for relevance. For ACM CSUR we apply a
keyword search to the corpus.
IEEE S&P has published 35 SoK papers since the venue initiated the SoK
publication option in 2010. We make an exhaustive evaluation of relevance
based on title and abstracts. Our basic relevance criterion in this case is if the
SoK is about designing or evaluating investigations of maliciousness. Of the 35
SoK papers, only Herley and van Oorschot (2017) and Rossow et al. (2012) are
applicable to our project. I have done prior work explaining why each of these
is insufficient for our purposes. Spring et al. (2017) addresses the shortcomings
in Herley and van Oorschot (2017). Hatleback and Spring (2014) expands and
generalizes the good work of Rossow et al. (2012). None of the SoK papers
systematize knowledge of incident response, investigation, or analysis.
Our CSUR keyword search uses Google Scholar, limiting to publications in
“ACM Computing Surveys” between Jan 1, 2007 and Aug 1, 2017. We use the
keywords used in the main study, as described in Section 4.1. However, CSUR
is a sufficiently different venue from our intended scope that we sometimes find
different keywords more useful. The surveys returned by the following search
terms are included in Table 1. Quotes are applied to the search as listed.
1. “computer security incident response”
2. “incident investigation”
3. “incident management”
4. “computer security” & “evidence collection”
5. “incident response” & analysis
6. “security incident” & investigation
7. “computer security” & incident investigation
8. “computer security” & incident analysis
These eight searches within CSUR return 22 unique results. Note in partic-
ular that the two most precisely relevant searches return no matches. As the
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Found in search # Criteria
Document 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3
Li et al. (2017a) ✓
Li et al. (2017b) ✓
Jiang et al. (2016)
Jhaveri et al. (2017) ✓ ✓
Pendleton et al. (2016)
Khan et al. (2016) ✓ ✓
Laszka et al. (2014) ✓ ✓
Biddle et al. (2012)
Milenkoski et al. (2015) ✓
Tang et al. (2016)
Meng et al. (2015)
Calzavara et al. (2017) ✓
Labati et al. (2016) ✓
Ye et al. (2017) ✓
Edwards et al. (2015)* ✓ ✓ ✓
Avancha et al. (2012)
Roy et al. (2015) ✓
Chandola et al. (2009) ✓ ✓
Pearce et al. (2013) ✓ ✓
Peng et al. (2007) ✓
Younan et al. (2012) ✓
Egele et al. (2008)* ✓ ✓
Table 1: Potentially relevant literature reviews from ACM CSUR. The three
relevance criteria are (1) relates to forensics rather than prediction; (2) technical,
investigative focus; (3) useful level of abstraction of incident response. Papers
with an asterisk (*) are discussed in more detail in the text.
search terms are expanded to include more general, related terms, we find a
handful of possibly relevant results.
Two search terms were tried on CSUR but returned too many clearly irrel-
evant results to be considered useful. Namely, {“computer security” & analysis}
with 79 results and {“computer security” & reporting} with 25. Any relevant
papers appear to be included in the 22 captured by Table 1.
To determine whether any of these 22 surveys already adequately cover our
topic of interest, we set out three relevance criteria. The survey must:
1. relate to reconstructing past events (i.e., forensics) rather than prediction;
2. focus on the technical- and knowledge-based decisions and processes, rather
than management processes;
3. use our target level of abstraction to discuss the problem of incident re-
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sponse, investigation, or analysis (human decisions during the process),
rather than tool development, without being so abstract as to make im-
plementation impractical.
These criteria are marked in Table 1, based on each paper’s abstract. Some
papers deserved a look beyond their abstracts.
Edwards et al. (2015) is the only survey that meets all three criteria, based
on their abstract. However, their focus is quite different from our intended fo-
cus. They discuss automation of law-enforcement criminal investigation using
computer science techniques. There may be overlap with computer-security in-
cident response, in that some subset of law enforcement cases involve criminal
action against computers. However, the focus of Edwards et al. (2015) is what
Anderson et al. (2012, p. 3) call, quoting the European Commission, “tradi-
tional forms of crime... committed over electronic communication networks and
information systems.” Incident response and investigation focuses on a different
category, “crimes unique to electronic networks,” as well as organizational policy
violations that are not illegal under the relevant jurisdiction. Finally, Edwards
et al. (2015) focus on automation of police tasks, whereas our focus would be
on the investigator’s decision process in, among other things, choosing which
automation techniques to use and how to evaluate the evidence they provide.
These various differences make a clear case that our intended survey topic is
sufficiently distinct from Edwards et al. (2015).
Egele et al. (2008, p. 1) aims to identify “techniques to assist human analysts
in assessing ... whether a given sample deserves closer manual inspection.” It
is, in fact, a survey of software tools and their features, and does not discuss
how an analyst should use them.
Many papers in Table 1 meet the technical criterion (#2) and fail the other
two criteria. This pattern tends to be about some specific subset of network
defense – for example, making better passwords, intrusion detection systems, or
web browser defenses. These tools are certainly used and evaluated as part of
security management, and are important considerations. However, these details
are tangential to making decisions during incident response and investigation.
These reviews of the available survey literature demonstrate a lacuna; we
lack a survey of incident response and investigation practices. This omission
matters. Most security research and security management requires, directly or
indirectly, “ground truth” evidence from incident response teams. Research and
management need this “ground truth” evidence to evaluate any other security
infrastructure, plans, defenses, or policy. However, it seems there is no system-
atic review of how this evidence should be collected, analyzed, and reported.
One must understand these steps in order to properly interpret any such evid-
ence. Therefore, although our topic is narrow, it has far-reaching impact on
information security more generally.
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4 Methods
The scope of our topic is restricted to evidence collection, analysis, and report-
ing in human-driven computer security incident response. We further restrict
our review to internationally-recognized standards. This choice keeps us as in
touch as possible to actual professional practice without violating confidentiality
around incident response, which organizations justifiably do not often disclose
in detail.
We explain our methodology in three parts. First, our search strategy.
Secondly, our appraisal strategy for whether to include what we find in our
synthesis. And finally, how we plan to synthesize the results into a coherent
statement of current practice.
4.1 Search strategy
The major determining factor in our literature search strategy is the scope of
publication venues, as justified in Section 2.2. Our search comes in two parts.
First, we perform keyword searches in the relevant web archives. Secondly, we
extract references from valid hits on these searches and include the referenced
documents as sources to appraise.
The IC documents are selected by fiat, given the secretive nature of the
community. Due to the idiosyncratic nature of the IC publication and publicity
processes, there is no sense in a keyword search strategy. We have arrived at the
three core documents we shall consider as the “standards” from this community
essentially by word of mouth through interaction with practitioners.
Each of IETF,13 FIRST,14 and ISO15 have dedicated web pages. For IETF and
ISO, we use their site-based search engines that cover their respective corpora
of standards. FIRST has a smaller, more focused corpus of work, such that it
does not have a site specific search engine; we use Google and prepend the term
“site:first.org” to focus the search.
Quotes are applied to the search as listed. The keywords employed are:
1. “computer security incident response”
2. “incident investigation”
3. “incident management”
4. “computer security” & “evidence collection”
5. “computer security” & analysis
6. “computer security” & reporting
13https://www.rfc-editor.org/search/rfc search.php
14https://first.org/standards/
15https://www.iso.org/standards.html
13
We also added or modified terms slight to accommodate each search venue. The
IETF RFC search tool does not accommodate mixing quoted phrases with other
terms, so for terms 4, 5, and 6 the quotes were removed. We added the following
terms to the IETF search:
• “incident response”
We added the following terms to the ISO search, after it became apparent from
searches 2 and 3 that the ISO documents do not use the term “computer security”
but rather “information security”:
• “information security” & “evidence collection”
• “information security” & analysis
• “information security” & reporting
All the documents returned by this search strategy are appraised using the
methods of Section 4.2. We then take a further search step and extract the
references from those documents that pass the appraisal. We only include any
cited documents which are publicly available (or, in the case of ISO, readily
available). All the documents extracted from the references are appraised us-
ing the same methods to determine whether they are included in our review,
independent of the document that cited it.
4.2 Appraisal strategy
The purpose of the appraisal is to determine whether each document is within
the scope of evidence collection, analysis, and reporting for incident response.
Our cutoff date for inclusion in the review is that the document must be pub-
lished by July 1, 2017.
Furthermore, because standards follow an orderly progression, they may be
superseded or amended by future work. Drafts are also commonly published for
public comment before being finalized. We exclude any standard superseded as
of July 1, 2017, and incorporate any amendments finalized by July 1, 2017. We
note the existence of drafts on new topics, but exclude their content from the
review.
Our specific inclusion criteria for whether the content is in-scope are the
following:
• Target audience as expressed by author includes security professionals
• Topic is within scope, namely it applies to one of the following parts of
computer-security incident response (or some clear synonym thereof)
– evidence collection
– analysis
– reporting
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• Topic is on investigator practice (rather than implementation of software
or managerial considerations related to CSIRTs)
• Document is finalized (not a draft) and not explicitly superseded as of
July 1, 2017
• Document is available in English
A document must satisfy all of these criteria in order to be included in the
review.
4.3 Synthesis methods
The input at this stage of the method will be all documents that are in scope;
they will be documents for security professionals about investigator practice
during evidence collection, analysis, and reporting. Our synthesis goal is to
evaluation the nature and quality of advice that these documents provide about
making decisions during these phases of incident response.
As a prelude to our synthesis, we classify advice on these topics in sev-
eral ways: to which phases the document applies, the directness with which
the document applies to each phase, the type, investigative goals supported,
broadness of scope, generalizability of advice, and formalism. We use this ini-
tial evaluation to identify groupings of documents and get an overview what
the literature search has found to be available. The following describes each
evaluation in more detail.
Phases indicates simply what combination of evidence collection, analysis, and
reporting the document covers.
Directness has two possible values: direct and constraints. Direct comment-
ary on incident response explicitly talks about what an investigator should
or should not do. Constraints provide only requirements for outcomes or
outputs, and do not indicate how these properties should be achieved.
Constraint-based advice is common when situating investigation within
the larger context of incident response, and situating response within in-
cident management.
Type indicates what type and level of detail the document provides to decision
making. Possible values are case study, ontology, advice, and instructions.
At one end of the spectrum are case studies. Case studies report the facts
of an individual case of investigation, without attempting to abstract up
to general lessons. A categorization forms categories of useful actions
(implicitly or explicitly from case studies), but gives no advice on how to
apply these categories. Advice provides some ordering on what category
of action should be taken, given certain conditions. Finally, instructions
provide explicit decision-making instructions on how to evaluate options.
Type also provides some rough guide to how much effort it will take to
apply the document to practice, with case studies being the most difficult.
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Goals indicates what sort of investigation the advice targets. We distinguish
three goals an investigator could have: fix the system, gather intelligence
on adversaries, and make arrests. Certainly, there may be other goals, but
these cover a wide degree of practical differences. Investigators need quite
different information between these goals. For example, to fix a system,
one needs to know everything that has been accessed by the adversary,
but you need to know rather little about them. Whereas to make arrests,
one cares very much about the adversary, but also is bound by several
practical matters of what counts as admissible legal evidence of attribution
and loss. When gathering intelligence on what an adversary may do next,
these legal considerations fall away, but one also focuses on quite different
aspects than fixing a system. For example, to gather adequate intelligence
one need not enumerate all compromised systems.
Scope reports how widely the document applies, as reported by the docu-
ment. Options are narrow, medium, and broad. A narrowly-scoped doc-
ument is intended to apply to only a small, non-representative group of
people, and/or for a short period of time. Broad scopes are intended for
most people within information security. Medium scope fits somewhere
in between. Examples of medium scope are US-based law enforcement
forensics specialists, or the operators of tier-three (that is, backbone) net-
works.
Generalizability of advice indicates how likely the document can be relevant
to contexts outside those for which it was specifically designed. Gen-
eralizability is explicitly level-set from the document’s scope. Thus, a
document with broad scope but no generalizability may still be applicable
to more people than a narrowly-scoped document that is generalizable.
Whereas scope is a measure taken directly from the document being eval-
uated, generalizability is an evaluation of potential not explicit in the
document. Indicators of generalizability include use of models or methods
from other disciplines with well-established other uses or evidence from
sources other than the document itself that the advice from the document
applies more widely. Options for this criterion are coarsely set as unlikely
(< 15%,±5%), likely (in between unlikely and highly likely), and highly
likely (> 85%,±5%); values represent essentially the evaluator’s prior be-
lief on the document being applicable outside its stated scope. We have a
final value, widely, indicating the document is certainly generalizable bey-
ond its scope and is likely to be generalizable to a much broader scope.
Formalism reports the degree of mathematical formalism present in the advice
provided. Options are none, qualitative, formal, and perfunctory. Perfunc-
tory indicates formalization is present, but essentially unused to advance
the arguments or positions of the document. This rating does not mean
the formalism is wrong; however, it does indicate it would take significant
effort on the part of the reader to make use of the formalism beyond what
qualitative models would provide. None only applies to narratives that
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make no attempts at abstraction. Both qualitative models and formal
mathematical models have value in their own ways, and one should not
be considered preferred over the other per se.
After this classification of the documents is complete, we undertake a more
free form synthesis of the results. Our focus is on how investigators make de-
cisions about evaluating the quality and importance of evidence, generalize from
particular evidence to evidence of trends or patterns of behavior, and select what
to report based on security constraints as well as what others will find most con-
vincing. Although these align loosely with the three phases of investigation we
have highlighted, we are not making a one-to-one connection between the three
phases and our three focal points. For example, if an investigator knows some
kind of evidence is particularly convincing to report, that should impact what
they look for during the evidence collection phase. Section 6 reports the results
of this classification, examination of focal points, and identification of prelimin-
ary gaps.
4.4 Limitations
While these methods have much to recommend them, there are of course lim-
itations. Some of these are practical, such as the restriction to publications
available in English. Some limitations are a function of restricting the scope
to standards. Perhaps the most dangerous limitation is a result of the subject
matter – security practitioners tend to be secretive about their methodologies.
The restriction to English will naturally limit the results. For example, an in-
ternet search for (information security incident response) returns a couple dozen
results on Google as well as Google Scholar. This seems to be the preferred term
in mainland China, searching for computer security incident response returns
only a couple of Taiwanese sites.
The importance of this language choice on actually limiting documents avail-
able to us is less clear. EU and UN documents would be available in English as
a matter of policy. The US government, which publishes in English dominates
in this space, as do US companies. Countries that are not allied to the US and
have developed computer security capabilities are relatively few; basically just
the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While it is
possible these countries have published comprehensive decision making proced-
ures for incident response, it seems unlikely. It also seems likely that, given how
much attention the US security establishment pays to Russia and the PRC, if
such a thing were published it would be found and reported on, if not trans-
lated. For these reasons, we judge the impact of limiting our search to English
documents is a low risk.
Focusing on standards, and what they cite, limits the scope but also creates
other limitations. Indeed, reducing the scope to something manageable is one
goal of focusing on standards, and this seems to function as intended. However,
the type of information published in standards is different than that in academic
journals and conferences, and this imposes some limits on the work. Specifically,
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standards are on a slower publication cycle than academic work. This delay
would be a problem if our topic were covered much in the academic literature.
However, as indicated by Section 3, academic publications do not appear to
cover decision making during computer security incident response.
Creation of technology standards is itself a complex process, and as Sec-
tion 2.2 touches on, the process has a complex history in its own right (Spring,
2011). The way standards are made imposes its own limitations on our findings.
Standards are rarely made purely for the dissemination of information; rather,
they usually solidify a dominant business position. Security standards appear
to be an outlier from this norm, as they have unique concerns about correct-
ness and non-subversion (Kuhlmann et al., 2016). Incident response standards
are essentially unstudied within the academic standards literature; Kuhlmann
et al. (2016) mostly focus on cryptographic standards. This situation means
we accept a risk in that we do not know what biases may be embedded in the
creation of incident response standards. The standards literature provides evid-
ence there will be a bias, but has not studied incident response standards in
order to provide evidence for what that bias might be. We would like to know
whose interests are best served by the creation of incident response standards,
for example.
A closely related limitation of concern involves secrecy. Many incident re-
sponse organizations may not wish to disclose their processes and procedures
in detail, lest the adversary learn how to subvert or avoid them. Other areas
of information security experience similar publication restrictions. Incident re-
sponders likely have a legitimate concern in this regard, and may also have a
legal or regulatory requirement to keep certain information or processes private.
Therefore, this limitation imposes a significant risk that relevant information is
not public. Lack of access obviously limits the review. Our approach to reduce
the impact of this limitation is to understand that we ought to read between
the lines of available documents when we can justify expanding our interpret-
ation of a document’s contents with circumstantial evidence from the context
surrounding its publication. However, we must accept that there is an amount
of information about our topic which simply is not public and we cannot hope
to access for a public literature review. One could perhaps use news articles
and audit reports to attempt to evidence the extent to which organizations in
fact implement the available standards; we leave such investigations for future
work. We first need a baseline understanding of the standards literature from
which to begin.
5 Results
We present our results per search venue is Sections 5.1 through 5.4. Section 5.5
takes the results from these four venues, extracts the referenced documents from
the results, and evaluates these cited documents.
In summary, Table 2 lists the documents that are relevant to our review
scope and purpose, and will analyze them in depth. We have selected these 29
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documents from roughly 350 possible documents returned from search results
and references. Many tables documenting our the decisions that lead to these
results results can be found in the Appendix.
RFC 2196, §5.4 only (Fraser, 1997) 27035-1:2016 ISO/IEC (2016)
RFC 6545 (Moriarty, 2012) 27037 ISO/IEC (2012)
RFC 7203 (Takahashi et al., 2014) 27041 ISO/IEC (2015a)
RFC 7970 (Danyliw, 2016) 27042 ISO/IEC (2015b)
RFC 8134 (Inacio and Miyamoto, 2017) 27043 ISO/IEC (2015c)
NIST SP 800-61 r.2 (Cichonski et al., 2012) Kossakowski et al. (1999)
NIST SP 800-86 (Kent et al., 2006) Alberts et al. (2004)
NIST SP 800-83 r.1, §4 only (Souppaya and Scarfone, 2013)
Gorzelak et al. (2011) Mundie et al. (2014)
Hutchins et al. (2011) (The kill chain) Heuer (1999)
Caltagirone et al. (2013) (diamond model) Carrier and Spafford (2004)
Ciardhua´in (2004) Casey (2010, ch. 2)
Osorno et al. (2011) Leigland and Krings (2004)
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014b, ch. 5 only) Stoll (1988)
Cheswick (1992) Mitropoulos et al. (2006)
Table 2: All documents found to be relevant through the search methodology
5.1 IETF
Table 3 evaluates the results of our search procedure. We pass four documents
on, RFCs 6545, 7203, 7970, and 8134.
The IETF documents break down into two clear broad categories, Best Cur-
rent Practice (BCP) 21 on expectations for computer security incident response
(Brownlee and Guttman, 1998), and all the others, which are to do with Incident
Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF), its expansion, and usage.
As an expectations document, BCP 21 focuses primarily on the services
and support a CSIRT should provide to its constituency, who that constituency
should include, and so on. These considerations are vital to CSIRT operations;
however they are not directly relevant to our question at hand.
The IODEF projects in particular are feature CERT/CC staff heavily, Danyliw
and Inacio during all their RFC authorship, and Trammell contributed heavily
to SiLK (System for Internet-level Knowledge) while at CERT/CC before moving
on. Because CERT/CC is also heavily involved in FIRST, it is unsurprising to see a
sort of division of labor between the IETF documents and the FIRST documents.
In particular, the IODEF format focuses almost exclusively on technical issues
of data exchange and reporting format. The softer considerations, of how to
collect, evaluate, and analyze the data contained within IODEF remain in the
purview of FIRST.
Thus, as technical reporting formats are in our scope of reporting results,
all RFCs related to IODEF are relevant. There do not appear to be any other
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Criteria
Document 1 2 3 4 5
RFC 2350 (Brownlee and Guttman, 1998) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 3607 (Leech, 2003) ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 5070 (Danyliw et al., 2007) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 6045 (Moriarty, 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 6046 (Moriarty and Trammell, 2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 6545 (Moriarty, 2012) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 6546 (Trammell, 2012b) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 7203 (Takahashi et al., 2014) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 7970 (Danyliw, 2016) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 8134 (Inacio and Miyamoto, 2017) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 3: IETF database search results. The criteria are (1) target audience is
security professionals; (2) topic in scope, per Section 2.1; (3) focus is investig-
ator practices; (4) document finalized and not obsoleted as of Aug 1, 2017; (5)
available in English.
IETF documents within our scope.
These IODEF documents may at first seem to be out of scope, as we specified
that our scope is how investigators make decisions, not what tools or formats
they use to document them. This topic recurs in Section 5.5.1. IODEF is es-
sentially a language for talking about computer security incidents. However,
because we are not interested in data formats, we are not interested in the lan-
guage per se. IODEF is in scope because as a constructed language it makes
judgments about what aspects of incidents are important, necessary, or possible
to communicate. These judgments, at least implicitly, bear on what an invest-
igator should choose to report. We therefore judge IODEF as in-scope. However,
we stress that our intended scope is how to decide what information to report,
not what language in which to report it. Therefore, data formats and languages
for anything else remain out of scope.
5.2 ISO
Nine search terms return 31 total results, with 23 unique results displayed in
Table 4. ISO 27035-1, 27041, and 27043 meet our criteria to carry through to
the citation-harvesting and synthesis stage:
• Information security incident management, Part 1: Principles of incident
management (ISO/IEC, 2016)
• Guidance on assuring suitability and adequacy of incident investigative
method (ISO/IEC, 2015a)
• Incident investigation principles and processes (ISO/IEC, 2015c)
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Criteria
Document 1 2 3 4 5
IEC 31010:2009 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO 13485:2003 ✓
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27000:2009 ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27004:2016 ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27005:2011 ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27006:2011 ✓
ISO/IEC 27006:2015 ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27033-1:2009 ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27033-4:2014 ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27035:2011 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27035-2:2016 ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27041:2015 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC 27043:2015 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC TR 18044:2004 ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/IEC TR 20004:2015 ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/NP TS 11633-1 ✓ ✓
ISO/TR 11633-1:2009 ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/TR 11633-2:2009 ✓ ✓ ✓
ISO/TS 19299:2015 ✓ ✓
Table 4: ISO database search results. The criteria are (1) target audience is
security professionals; (2) topic in scope, per Section 2.1; (3) focus is investig-
ator practices; (4) document finalized and not obsoleted as of Aug 1, 2017; (5)
available in English.
5.3 FIRST
FIRST is the smallest body surveyed, and it is not primarily a standards organ-
ization but rather a forum for organizations with a shared purpose – incident
response.
On it’s “standards” web page, FIRST lists four standards it maintains:
• Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) on agreed-upon levels for marking information
sensitivity
• Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) on describing the charac-
teristics and severity of defects in software systems (not to be confused
with Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) by the Mitre Corpora-
tion (MITRE))
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Criteria
Document 1 2 3 4 5
Mundie et al. (2014) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Alberts et al. (2004) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
OCTAVE (Caralli et al., 2007) ✓ ✓ ✓
ENISA (2006) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cormack (2015) ✓ ✓ ✓
Gorzelak et al. (2011) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cichonski et al. (2012) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ETSI (2014) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 2350 (Brownlee and Guttman, 1998) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 2196 (Fraser, 1997, §5.4 only) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 2827 (Ferguson and Senie, 2000) ✓ ✓ ✓
RFC 2504 (Guttman et al., 1999) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 5: FIRST results summary. The criteria are (1) target audience is secur-
ity professionals; (2) topic in scope, per Section 2.1; (3) focus is investigator
practices; (4) document finalized as of Aug 1, 2017; (5) available in English.
• Information Exchange Policy (IEP) is a reporting format; in this regard it is
another language for reporting, similar to IODEF or those listed in Table 7.
IEP’s focus is on disseminating information responsibly and quickly during
incident response.
• passive Domain Name System (DNS) (pDNS) is a formatting standard for
DNS traffic analysis; the FIRST group is working on an IETF standard.
None of these standards meet our relevance criteria, because none are about
investigator practice. They are all things a competent investigator should know
how to interact with and interpret, but they do not help us understand what
decisions an investigator should make in a given scenario. FIRST also notes it
contributes to several ISO standards, which Section 5.2 covers (namely, 27010,
27032, 27035, 27037, and 29147).
More instructive than these standards are FIRST’s “Security Reference In-
dex” that are “helpful” to the FIRST community.16 FIRST’s members are many,
if not most, of the professionals and practitioners that we hope to come to un-
derstand. The documents Table 5 evaluates are listed as either best practices or
standards in this reference index.17 Five documents emerge as relevant to our
review: Alberts et al. (2004), Cichonski et al. (2012), Fraser (1997), Gorzelak
et al. (2011) and Mundie et al. (2014).
The security reference index also links to the home pages of other security
organizations; however, we cannot review the contents of everything these or-
16https://first.org/resources/guides/reference
17Strictly speaking, Mundie et al. (2014) and Alberts et al. (2004) are not linked dir-
ectly; they are the most relevant part of a suite of publications linked to by FIRST as
https://www.cert.org/incident-management/publications/index.cfm.
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ganizations have produced in full. In large part, the information is more about
solving specific technical problems than our target for a general problem solving
method. Such specific problems make for instructive cases when thinking about
generalized methods, and so these organizations do provide an integral function
to our topic. But they do not aim for the types of documents in scope of our
review. The organizations identified are:
• Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA), www.caida.org
• CERT/CC (formerly Computer Emergency Response Team), www.cert.org
• Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarking, http://www.cisecurity.org/
• Team Cymru, a security think tank, https://www.team-cymru.org/services.html
• EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/,
including CSIRT services https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirt-cert-services
• OpenWeb Application Security Project (OWASP), https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP Guide Project
• Microsoft Security Guidance Center https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc184906.aspx
• Sysadmin, Audit, Network, and Security Institute (SANS Institute) reading
room, https://www.sans.org/reading-room/
Although ENISA (2006) targets management rather than practitioners, it provides
links to training for practitioners. The two organizations the report lists are
CERT/CC and the EU-funded TRANSITS.
5.4 Intelligence community
The canonical training course for CIA and other intelligence analysts is Heuer
(1999). The book is essentially applied psychology. It covers topics such as
analyzing competing hypotheses, which includes evaluating whether evidence
has been planted to deceive, as well as overcoming human cognitive biases such
as anchoring, vividness, and oversensitivity to consistency. Such methods, es-
pecially for evaluating evidence in the face of deception, have clear relevance to
incident investigation.
The model of a computer attack as following a predictable ‘kill chain’ of
steps from start to finish was published by Lockheed Martin incident respon-
ders (Hutchins et al., 2011). The seven steps are reconnaissance, weaponiza-
tion, delivery, exploitation, installation, command-and-control, and actions on
objectives. These are the steps in one single attack – a single phishing email,
a single drive-by download with a malicious advert, etc. Adversaries almost
always compose a campaign out of multiple attacks; the objectives of one at-
tack may be to obtain a platform from which further attacks are possible. The
purpose of this model “is to capture something useful about the pattern all, or
at least nearly all, attacks follow,” so the analyst can anticipate what to look
for or expect next (Spring and Hatleback, 2017, p. 10).
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Criteria
Document 1 2 3 4 5
Heuer (1999) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Hutchins et al. (2011) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Caltagirone et al. (2013) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 6: Intelligence community results summary. The criteria are (1) target
audience is security professionals; (2) topic in scope, per Section 2.1; (3) focus
is investigator practices; (4) document finalized as of Aug 1, 2017; (5) available
in English.
Caltagirone et al. (2013) builds on attack ontologies, specifically the kill
chain, and intelligence analysis to perform attribution in computer security in-
cidents and analysis of whole campaigns. The method incorporates Bayesian
statistics to model belief updates of the analyst. These statistical details are
explicitly intended to help overcome analyst cognitive biases, such as those dis-
cussed in Heuer (1999).
5.5 Referenced Documents
We harvest citations from the standards identified as relevant in the prior parts
of Section 5. We summarize the results here; the evaluations are detailed in a
subsection for each publication venue. The documents harvested from citations
that are directly relevant to our review are:
• Carrier and Spafford (2004)
• Casey (2010, ch. 2)
• Ciardhua´in (2004)
• Leigland and Krings (2004)
• 27037 ISO/IEC (2012)
• 27042 ISO/IEC (2015b)
• NIST SP 800-83 rev 1, §4 only
(Souppaya and Scarfone, 2013)
• NIST SP 800-86 (Kent et al.,
2006)
• Osorno et al. (2011)
• Kossakowski et al. (1999)
• Cheswick (1992)
• Stoll (1988)
• Mitropoulos et al. (2006)
• Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014b, ch. 5
only)
5.5.1 IETF documents
The four relevant IETF standards reference 97 unique documents, excluding the
IODEF-related standards already considered in Section 5.1. These documents fall
into three broad categories: technical implementation requirements and depend-
encies; other related computer-security-incident report formats; and broader in-
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cident handling guidelines that describe the larger analysis and response context
within which the reporting formats are used. This first category of implement-
ation dependencies is not relevant to our project. Therefore, we focus on other
reporting documents and broader incident handling guidelines. There are 22
cited reporting-related documents and exactly one related to broader incident
handling and use of the reporting formats.
Table 7 lists the reporting formats and data sources cited by the IETF res-
ults in Section 5.1. Other report formats are primarily produced by NIST and
MITRE – with funding from the US government including NIST. These projects
also include the only referenced documents that are continuously updated data
archives. The data formats for Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE),
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), CWSS, Common Configuration Enu-
meration (CCE), Common Configuration Scoring System (CCSS), Common Plat-
form Enumeration (CPE) are also continuously populated and published by NIST
and MITRE as new vulnerabilities, platforms, etc. are discovered or developed.
Thus these projects provide not only a format, but a standard reference dic-
tionary of the possible terms with which the format may be populated. CVSS
is perhaps the most important of these metrics which provide data and scoring;
for a survey that relates CVSS to other security metrics, see Pendleton et al.
(2016).
These standard dictionaries are referenced by many of the other data formats
which inherit the field essentially as a data type. For example, Malware At-
tribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC) may indicate which vulner-
ability a malware targets using its CVE number. Such dictionaries are use-
ful background knowledge during incident response, and help reduce confusion
by providing common reference tags. However, following the pattern of other
documents surveyed, these reference dictionaries do not provide agreed-upon
evidence collection, field population, or analysis guidelines for their contents.
The next largest group of cited work from identified RFCs are three more
IETF documents related to IODEF that did not appear in the original search.
Other documents are also related to IODEF. CVRF and XEP-0268 extend and
implement IODEF, respectively. AirCERT is a proposed implementation ar-
chitecture that uses IODEF in automated indicator exchange. Our conclusions
about the IODEF results identified in Section 5.1 therefore apply equally to these
other documents, and we do not need to pay them special attention.
The remaining documents fall loosely into the NIST-MITRE orbit. ISO 19770
for asset management is developed separately from, but is related to, CPE and
CCE, NIST’s asset management for platforms and configurations, respectively.
MMDEF is not directly related to MAEC; however, MAEC has adopted a sig-
nificant component of the MMDEF schema.
The only citation related to actual decision making during an incident is
NIST SP 800-61 (Cichonski et al., 2012). This document is already included
from the FIRST results, see Section 5.3. Thus, from the IETF citations, we add
no new documents to the review.
25
5.5.2 ISO documents
We extract the references from the three relevant ISO standards, namely ISO/IEC
27035, ISO/IEC 27041:2015, ISO/IEC 27043:2015. ISO/IEC 27035 comes in two
parts; although only the first part is in scope, we extract references from both
parts. Although ISO charges for access to its documents, all the bibliographies
are freely available, so we include all documents in this step.
There are 81 total references among the documents, with 64 unique ref-
erences. Of these, 20 are elements of the ISO/IEC 27000 series of standards
explicitly targeting information security. Four are the documents already refer-
enced, and several others are already noted as not relevant in Table 4. However,
from the references we add the following two 27000-series publications to our
survey documents as relevant to our survey (27037 and 27042):
• Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of
digital evidence (ISO/IEC, 2012)
• Guidelines for the analysis and interpretation of digital evidence (ISO/IEC,
2015b)
Of the remaining 44 referenced documents, 13 are further ISO standards. Spe-
cifically:
ISO 15489-1
ISO 8601
ISO 9000
ISO/IEC 10118-2
ISO/IEC 12207:2008
ISO/IEC 17024:2012
ISO/IEC 17025:2005
ISO/IEC 17043:2010
ISO/IEC 20000
ISO/IEC 29147
ISO/IEC 30111
ISO/IEC 30121
ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148:2011
All of these other ISO documents are out of scope. We can further remove the
following as unavailable or already evaluated: ILAC-G19, which directly follows
from ISO 17020 and 17025; RFC 5070 (Danyliw et al., 2007), see Section 5.1;
one by Valjarevic and Venter that is not available but appears by title and
timing to be a working group presentation discussing the other two papers by
these authors. We also will not consider the Daubert 1993 US Supreme Court
case, as we aim to be jurisdiction neutral. Removing these leaves the documents
listed and evaluated for relevance in Table 8. We pass the following documents
on to the next stage of analysis: Carrier and Spafford (2004), Casey (2010),
Ciardhua´in (2004) and Leigland and Krings (2004). And, like the IETF, ISO
cites NIST SP 800-61 (Cichonski et al., 2012).
Also cited are two further MITRE data formats not covered in Section 5.5.1:
STIX (Structured Threat Information eXpression) and TAXII (Trusted Auto-
mated eXchange of Indicator Information). These build on MAEC, CVE, and
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so on as formats for exchanging incident data. Like the other reporting formats
already discussed, STIX and TAXII are not directly relevant to our incident
response decision-making topic. They are a language in which to do report-
ing; reporting is in scope. However, we plan to discuss what to report in a
language-independent way.
The ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) guidelines are represent-
ative of many of the documents in Table 8. Their target audience is “UK law
enforcement personnel who may deal with digital evidence” (Williams, 2012,
p. 6). It is primarily about the legal chain of custody necessary to bring digital
evidence to court. This topic is about evidence collection, so it is in scope.
But the target audience is law enforcement, not security practitioners. The
guidelines are not transferable to our topic of interest. The extent of comment
on the actual work of understanding what the digital evidence means is con-
strained to “it is not practically possible to examine every item of digital data
and clear tasking is needed to ensure that the digital forensic practitioner has
the best chance of finding any evidence which is relevant to the investigation”
(Williams, 2012, p. 10).
Some relevant work will not be carried through because it is obsoleted in a
rather round-about way. Valjarevic and Venter (2012a, p. 1) notes “an effort
to standardise the process has started within ISO, by the authors.” Thus we
consider papers by these authors to be obsolete because the authors directly
subsumed their ideas into the ISO process. The process classes and activities
used by ISO are clearly derived from Valjarevic and Venter (2012b, p. 6), which
also contains a matrix of how these reference terms relate to other common
forensic investigation ontologies. This set of works cited18 matches the ISO work
remarkably closely, as would be expected since the primary authors are the same.
Unfortunately, Valjarevic and Venter (2012b) gives absolutely no methodology
for how they arrived at this list of resources. Their analysis method is also
not discussed, so it is unclear how or why they arrived at their categories and
classification.
These omissions are particularly strange in that Valjarevic and Venter (2012b,
p. 3) quotes Cohen et al. (2011) as rightly concluding the next steps in reaching
consensus on and improving the field of digital forensics are a review of the
literature that can be used to accurately drive consensus. This task is clearly
what’s been attempted, and as it has become an ISO standard it seems to have
been accepted by a variety of practitioners. However, the lack of explanation
of how these documents were selected as the correct set from which to drive
consensus makes it hard to trace the authoritativeness of this source.
18Specifically, the overlapping works cited are Ballou et al. (2001), Beebe and Clark (2005),
Carrier and Spafford (2003), Casey (2010), Ciardhua´in (2004), Cohen (2010), Leigland and
Krings (2004), Reith et al. (2002) and Williams (2012)
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Publisher Type Name
CERT/CC Architecture Automated Incident Reporting (AirCERT)
ICASI Format Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework
(CVRF)
IEEE Format Malware Metadata Exchange Format
(MMDEF)
IETF
Format Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Format (IDMEF)
Format Incident Object Description Exchange
Format Extensions (IODEF+)
Format RFC 5941, Sharing Transaction Fraud Data
(extends IODEF)
ISO Format Software asset management: Software identi-
fication tag (ISO 19770)
FIRST Data Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS)
MITRE
Format Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification (CAPEC)
Format Common Event Expression (CEE)
Data Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE)
Data Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Data Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS)
Format Malware Attribute Enumeration and Char-
acterization (MAEC)
Format Open Vulnerability and Assessment Lan-
guage (OVAL)
NIST
Data Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE)
Data Common Configuration Scoring System
(CCSS)
Data Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)
Format Open Checklist Interactive Language (OCIL)
Format Security Content Automation Protocol
(SCAP)
Format Extensible Configuration Checklist Descrip-
tion Format (XCCDF)
XMPP Format XEP-0268 Incident Handling (using IODEF)
Table 7: Computer-security related reporting formats and data formats cited
by IETF standards documents.
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Criteria
Document 1 2 3 4 5
Williams (2012) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Valjarevic and Venter (2012b) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Valjarevic and Venter (2012a) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Carrier and Spafford (2003) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Carrier and Spafford (2004) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Edwards et al. (2009) ✓ ✓
Casey (2010) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cohen (2010) ✓ ✓ ✓
Cohen et al. (2011) ✓ ✓ ✓
Palmer (2001) ✓ ✓
Pollitt (2008) ✓ ✓ ✓
Reith et al. (2002) ✓ ✓ ✓
Beebe and Clark (2005) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ciardhua´in (2004) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Leigland and Krings (2004) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Rowlingson (2004) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Hankins et al. (2009) ✓ ✓ ✓
SWGDE (2009) ✓ ✓
Garfinkel et al. (2009) ✓ ✓ ✓
Ballou et al. (2001) ✓ ✓ ✓
Alberts et al. (2014) ✓ ✓
Cichonski et al. (2012) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 8: ISO database search results. The criteria are (1) target audience is
security professionals; (2) topic in scope, per Section 2.1; (3) focus is investig-
ator practices; (4) document finalized and not obsoleted as of Aug 1, 2017; (5)
available in English.
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5.5.3 FIRST Documents
As Table 5 demonstrates, we pass five FIRST-related documents through the
evaluation of results to harvest further citations. Three of these documents do
not have any citations ready to harvest. RFC 2196 (Fraser, 1997) does not
have in-line citations, and only §5.4 is relevant, so the relevant citations to fol-
low cannot be distinguished. Further, RFC 2196 is already 20 years old, and
so following any citations would provide little modern benefit. On the other
hand, Gorzelak et al. (2011) is a primary source – it is a survey of preventative
practices at over 100 CSIRTs. Gorzelak et al. (2011) notes the tools that the
respondents use, but it makes no citations to other incident response methodo-
logy documents. Alberts et al. (2004) is similarly a primary source, though on
incident management from CERT/CC. The only reference we take from Alberts
et al. (2004) is where it explicitly indicates further information on incident
analysis is contained in another CERT document, namely Kossakowski et al.
(1999). Therefore, we harvest citations primarily from Cichonski et al. (2012)
and Mundie et al. (2014).
Cichonski et al. (2012) references three classes of resources. First is a list of
incident response organizations, secondly a list of NIST publications related to
incident response, and finally a list of applicable data formats. The list of organ-
izations includes many already discussed in Section 5.3. Those jointly listed by
NIST and FIRST are CERT/CC, ENISA, and FIRST itself. NIST additionally lists
the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG); Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section (CCIPS); Government FIRST (GFIRST); High Technology Crime
Investigation Association (HTCIA); InfraGuard; the Internet Storm Center (ISC);
the National Council of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); and
US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). These organizations are
certainly involved in various aspects of incident response. However, organiza-
tions as such are out of the scope of our review.19
Table 9 lists and evaluates the relevance of the NIST publications referenced
by Cichonski et al. (2012). All of these publications contribute to relevant
background knowledge. For example, any incident response professional will
need to know what a intrusion detection and prevention system is and how
they are deployed (SP 800-94). But this topic is not about evidence collection,
analysis, and reporting; it is merely necessary background knowledge. The two
publications that are relevant are the guides toMalware Incident Prevention and
Handling for Desktops and Laptops (Souppaya and Scarfone, 2013, §4 only) and
Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response (Kent et al., 2006).
The data exchange formats listed by Cichonski et al. (2012) are quite similar
to those NIST, IODEF, and MITRE formats extracted from the IETF documents
19As a convenient sample, I have presented at APWG (Spring, 2013; Spring et al., 2015)
and attended InfraGuard meetings, and I do not expect there would be significant benefit in
expanding the scope to include them. Likewise, I have interacted with several ISACs, and
reviewed their available materials (Research and Education Networking Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (ISAC) (REN-ISAC) and Financial Services Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC) (FS-ISAC) especially) and do not believe they have any documents of
importance to our topic.
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Criteria
Document 1 2 3 4 5
SP 800-53 (Ross et al., 2013) ✓ ✓ ✓
SP 800-83 (§4) (Souppaya and Scarfone, 2013) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SP 800-84 (Grance et al., 2006) ✓ ✓ ✓
SP 800-86 (Kent et al., 2006) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SP 800-92 (Kent and Souppaya, 2006) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SP 800-94 (Scarfone and Mell, 2007) ✓ ✓ ✓
SP 800-115 (Scarfone et al., 2008) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SP 800-128 (Johnson et al., 2011) ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 9: NIST publications referenced by Cichonski et al. (2012). The criteria are
(1) target audience is security professionals; (2) topic in scope, per Section 2.1;
(3) focus is investigator practices; (4) document finalized and not obsoleted as
of Aug 1, 2017; (5) available in English.
in Table 7. The only difference is the addition of Asset Identification (AI),
Asset Results Format (ARF), CVSS (from FIRST, see Section 5.3), and Cyber
Observable eXpression (CybOX). As discussed in Section 5.5.1, these formats
are languages for reporting results, but they do not directly discuss what to say.
Our intention is to discuss what to say in results, while being language agnostic,
which puts these various formats and languages just out of scope.
Mundie et al. (2014) cites 27 documents. They include several technical
format documents for ontologies in the W3C Ontology Web Language (OWL),
KL-ONE knowledge representation, knowledge graphs, process specification lan-
guage (PSL), or the display tools used (Graphviz), which we will not discuss.
There are also psychology and ontology that are obviously out of scope for our
review (Baader, 2003; Miller, 1956). Further, four references we have already
considered, namely ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27002, Cichonski et al. (2012), and
Beebe and Clark (2005). These exceptions leave the eight documents evaluated
in Table 10. The only documents that pass the evaluation are Osorno et al.
(2011) and Kossakowski et al. (1999).
MITRE (2010) on whether cybersecurity is a science is not within our cur-
rent, relatively narrow scope. However, since incident response is an important
subset of cybersecurity, whether security investigations are a kind of subcategory
of scientific investigation clearly impacts our handling of what incident response
is and how to link it to knowledge generation and evidence evaluation more gen-
erally. Spring et al. (2017) address the relationship between cybersecurity and
science and argue that cybersecurity as practiced is a kind of science.
Fenz and Ekelhart (2009) provides a difficult decision. It is one of the few at-
tempts at formalization. However, its target is security knowledge, not security
practice. This topic is closely allied to our hope to formalize incident response,
as security knowledge would be instrumental to that project. So while not in
scope for this review, this document may be useful for future related work.
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Criteria
Document 1 2 3 4 5
MITRE (2010) ✓ ✓ ✓
Mundie and Ruefle (2012) ✓ ✓ ✓
Fenz and Ekelhart (2009) ✓ ✓ ✓
Osorno et al. (2011) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Magklaras and Furnell (2001) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Wang and Guo (2009) ✓ ✓ ✓
Chiang et al. (2009) ✓ ✓ ✓
Ekelhart et al. (2007) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Kossakowski et al. (1999) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 10: Documents referenced by the CERT documents. The criteria are (1)
target audience is security professionals; (2) topic in scope, per Section 2.1; (3)
focus is investigator practices; (4) document finalized and not obsoleted as of
Aug 1, 2017; (5) available in English.
5.5.4 IC Documents
Heuer (1999) presents some challenges to adequate reference harvesting. The
book contains no collected list of references, written in a traditional humanities
style in which references are in footnotes intermixed with commentary, but this
is not the central problem. As essentially a military intelligence and psychology
book, its sources are quite wide-ranging. References range from World War II
Nazi-propaganda analysis to behavioral economics. It is only through Heuer’s
CIA experience that these disparate sources are converted into a useful guide on
how to reason in adversarial situations. The other challenge is that Heuer (1999)
makes only passing reference to computers as tabulating machines. The closest
he seems to get to computer science is via Simon (1996), as he discusses decision-
making and satisficing. For these three reasons we consider Heuer (1999) as
essentially a primary source and do not trace citations from it. One should not
be surprised it has many features of a primary source, as surely its main value
is summarizing CIA analytic experience not otherwise publicly available.
Caltagirone et al. (2013) and Hutchins et al. (2011) are more straightforward.
There are 79 citations between the two, with no overlap, though Caltagirone
et al. (2013) cites both Hutchins et al. (2011) and Heuer (1999). The refer-
ences in Caltagirone et al. (2013) are noticeably more strategy-focused over the
tactically-focused Hutchins et al. (2011), as one would expect from their dif-
ferent topics. Hutchins et al. (2011) cites several vulnerability bulletins and
company advisories as cases; it is more of a primary source, documenting the
analysis methods used by Lockheed Martin incident response staff. We do not
consider such advisories, software tool documentation, and news items, as they
are not within our review topic. There are also several references already covered
elsewhere: Cichonski et al. (2012), STIX, CVE, and SANS. There is even yet
a new reporting and data exchange format: Vocabulary for Event Recording
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and Incident Sharing (VERIS). We also exclude references that are merely the
official definitions of terminology. These exceptions reduce the total referenced
works to 50.
The kill chain (Hutchins et al., 2011) and the diamond model (Caltagirone
et al., 2013) are both attack ontologies. They model the possible routes an
adversary may take when executing an attack. One big class of cited work is
other attack ontologies. We consider the kill chain and diamond model as de
facto standard ontologies, but we believe they reached that level of agreement
within the IC because they also come with investigative norms for interpreting
and filling in the ontologies. There are many other attack ontology works that
do not come with such guidance, and so we will not consider them directly in
scope for our review. We remove 16 references from consideration because they
are attack-ontologies without guidance.
There are also several references that are clearly for background or motiv-
ation, such as Hawkins (2004), Liu and Motoda (1998), Symantec’s analysis
of the Duqu malware, and assessments of Chinese attack capabilities. We also
remove how-to descriptions for conducting particular methods of technical ana-
lysis, namely on passive DNS analysis (Antonakakis et al., 2011), crime-pattern
analysis (Palmiotto, 1988), and honeypots via the Honeynet Project. This leaves
us with 22 documents in Table 11. Of these, four pass our relevance require-
ments: Cheswick (1992),20 Stoll (1988), Mitropoulos et al. (2006), and Joint
Chiefs of Staff (2014b, ch. 5 only).
20Technically the citation is to this article’s republication in a popular textbook, Cheswick
et al. (2003, ch. 16). However, as the rest of the textbook is not directly referenced, we
reference just the original publication.
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Criteria
Document 1 2 3 4 5
Stamos (2010) ✓ ✓ ✓
Amann et al. (2012) ✓ ✓ ✓
Cheswick (1992) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Stoll (1988) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Duran et al. (2009) ✓ ✓ ✓
Cohen (1995) ✓ ✓ ✓
Lewis (2008) ✓ ✓
Tirpak (2000) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Hayes (2008) ✓ ✓ ✓
Willison and Siponen (2009) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mitropoulos et al. (2006) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Caltagirone and Frincke (2005) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Caltagirone (2005) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Bellovin (1992) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
McClure et al. (2005) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Brenner (2002) ✓ ✓
Van Eck (1985) ✓ ✓ ✓
John and Olovsson (2008) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014a) ✓ * ✓
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2013) ✓ ✓ * ✓
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014b, ch. 5 only) ✓ ✓ ✓ * ✓
Table 11: Documents referenced by Caltagirone et al. (2013) and Hutchins et al.
(2011). The criteria are (1) target audience is security professionals; (2) topic in
scope, per Section 2.1; (3) focus is investigator practices; (4) document finalized
and not obsoleted as of Aug 1, 2017; (5) available in English. The (*) in criterion
four indicates we are referencing an updated version of the document.
6 Discussion
Table 12 classifies advice on these topics in several ways: to which phases the
document applies, the directness with which the document applies to each phase,
the applicability of the advice, investigative goals supported, broadness of scope,
generalizability of advice, and formalism. We shall make some commentary on
all the documents in the Table, in order of appearance, with one exception.
Before we lose ourself amongst the trees of this discussion, we will make our
general claim of the primary gap in the literature clear up front. Our evocative
evidence for this claim will be the three NIST publications, as they make the
point most clearly. After discussing these, we go on to discuss the ISO, IETF,
etc. documents in the order they appear in Table 12.
Despite recommending everyone use a methodical approach, NIST fails to
provide one. This failure is symptomatic of the state of available practicable
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policy advice and practitioner training material. This is the central gap identi-
fied by the literature review: There may be adequate concrete tools and training
available, but there is no general training or policy advice for strategic selection
of tactics, that is, which analysis heuristic or technical tool to employ
in a particular situation and why. An attendant gap is a failure to advise
on when the investigator is justified in generalizing; that is, making a
stronger, broader claim from singular pieces of evidence. Because there is no ad-
vice on which strategy to employ, or when broadening claims are justified, there
is similarly a gap in what information to report in order to convince a
reader that the investigator should be believed.
Upon glancing through NIST SP 800-61 (Cichonski et al., 2012) it is obvious
why all four of our venues reference it or use it as their standard directly. It
is comprehensive and thorough without being overbearing. However, its focus
is incident management, not investigation. The analysis phase receives about
three pages of discussion (p 28-30), reporting one page (p 31),21 and evidence
collection half a page (p 36), and general decision making and prioritization
two pages (p 32-33). Cichonski et al. (2012, p 32) addresses the problem of
scarce resources directly: “prioritizing the handling of the incident is perhaps
the most critical decision point in the incident handling process.” The following
discussion, while short, is two more pages about decision-making during incident
analysis than almost any other document found. Regardless, it is not sufficient
to develop a robust account of the nuances and difficulties an investigator reg-
ularly deals with when evaluating evidence, generalizing from particulars, and
deciding how best to report their findings.
NIST SP 800-83 (Souppaya and Scarfone, 2013) §4.2 is titled “detection and
analysis,” yet we have provocatively labeled the document has having no bear-
ing on the analysis phase. The section’s advice on analysis is, however, entirely
tool-focused pragmatics. Analysis should take place on an isolated or virtualized
operating system to prevent spread of infection, and so on. The document men-
tions some fields that the investigator may want to collect, such as file names,
service ports, and “how to remove the malware.” There is no advice on how to
obtain this information, why, or what it might be useful for. Therefore, these
are best understood as reporting constraints, not analysis advice. This result
is disappointing, considering §4 gives its opening motivation as “this section of
the guide builds on the concepts of SP 800-61 by providing additional details
about responding to malware incidents.”
NIST SP 800-86 Kent et al. (2006) suffers similarly to SP 800-83; it consists
of a stream of data formats and types and assumes that the investigator will
know what to do know that the possible data types have been listed. These
make up underlying technical skills necessary for an investigation, and so are
not completely irrelevant to incident response. However, they do not help us un-
derstand how investigators make decisions. The extent of the advice on analysis
again amounts to essentially a reporting and collection constraints, respectively:
21SP 800-61 acknowledges its discussion of reporting is too brief, and refers the reader to
RFC 5070. This document has since been obsoleted by RFC 7970 (Danyliw, 2016).
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“the analysis should include identifying people, places, items, and events, and
determining how these elements are related... often, this effort will include
correlating data among multiple sources” (Kent et al., 2006, p 3-6).
These NIST documents provide a useful effort to summarize our gaps and in-
tended way forward. Kent et al. (2006, p 3-8) recommends all organizations have
an incident response capability and that analysts use “a methodical approach
to a digital forensic investigation.” The document clearly states the importance
of digital forensic investigation and advises on terminology, analysis techniques,
and pitfalls to avoid. Despite NIST’s policy recommendation to do so, based on
this survey NIST does not actually provide a methodical approach to analyzing
data during an investigation. SP 800-61 comes closest, but the discussion of
analysis method there still amounts to an unordered collection of tips, tricks,
and pitfalls to avoid. While these are all accurate and sound advice, they do
not comprise a method. The NIST documents evaluated and surveyed here are
a generally positive attempt at providing practical advice to a wide audience
on a complex topic. Their focus is practical guides on aspects of tools used in
digital forensics. But the assumption is that once an investigator is taught how
to use a tool, they will know when and why to use it. This gap is a recurring
assumption, and precisely our intended focus for improvement.
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Directness
per Phase
Scope
per Goal
Document Col Anz Rep Fix Int LE General Type Formal
27035-1:2016 (ISO/IEC, 2016) C C C B Un Ont Qual
27037 ISO/IEC (2012) D M Un Ont Qual
27041 (ISO/IEC, 2015a) C C C Likely Instr ∅
27042 ISO/IEC (2015b) D D M Un Instr ∅
27043(ISO/IEC, 2015c) C C C B M Un Ont Qual
RFC 2196, §5.4 only (Fraser, 1997) C D M B Likely Instr ∅
RFC 6545 (Moriarty, 2012) C C D N B Un Ont Formal
RFC 7203 (Takahashi et al., 2014) C C N N N Un Ont Formal
RFC 7970 (Danyliw, 2016) C D M M M Un Ont Formal
RFC 8134 (Inacio and Miyamoto, 2017) C B B Un Study ∅
NIST 800-61 (Cichonski et al., 2012) C D C M M Un Adv Qual
NIST 800-83 §4 (Souppaya and Scarfone, 2013) D C B Un Ont Qual
NIST 800-86 (Kent et al., 2006) C C High Study Qual
Gorzelak et al. (2011) (ENISA) D N Un Study Qual
Alberts et al. (2004) (CERT/CC) C B Un Ont Qual
Kossakowski et al. (1999) (CERT/CC) C D C M Likely Adv Qual
Mundie et al. (2014) (CERT/CC) C C C B High Ont Perf
Osorno et al. (2011) (JHU & US-CERT) C C B B High Ont Qual
Hutchins et al. (2011) (IC) C C M Un Adv Qual
Caltagirone et al. (2013) (IC) C D M High Adv Perf
Heuer (1999) (CIA) D B B B Wide Instr Qual
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014b, ch. 5 only) D M High Instr Qual
Casey (2010, ch. 2) C D D B Wide Ont Qual
Mitropoulos et al. (2006) C C C M N Un Study Qual
Carrier and Spafford (2004) D C D M Likely Ont Qual
Ciardhua´in (2004) C C C B Un Ont Perf
Leigland and Krings (2004) D N N N Likely Instr Formal
Stoll (1988) C D C N M N Likely Study ∅
Cheswick (1992) C D B Likely Study ∅
Table 12: Categorization of relevant documents. The phases are collection,
analysis, and reporting. Cells have a cross if a phase is not addressed. Advice
directness values are direct (D) or constraints-based (C). Values for goals are
to fix an infected system (fix), gathering intelligence (int), and law enforcement
(LE) action. Values for a document’s intended scope are narrow (N), medium
(M), or broad (B). Values for generalizability of an approach are unlikely (Un),
likely (Likely), highly likely (High), or already widely generalizable (Wide).
Document types are case studies (Study), ontologies (Ont), advice on actions
(Adv), and explicit instructions (Instr). Values for formalization are not present
(∅), qualitative (Qual), formal, or perfunctory (Perf).
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6.1 Comments and clarifications on Table 12
The ISO 27000-series is dedicated to information security. We have identi-
fied five standards on that are within our scope of the particular parts of in-
cident response. The relationship between these standards is documented
by Figure 1, reproduced in each of the ISO standards. This figure states
clearly that all the listed standards are applicable to “investigation process
classes and activities” (ISO/IEC, 2015c, p. ix). Process classes are read-
iness, initialization, acquisitive, and investigative; activities overlap these
classes, and are plan, prepare, respond, identify-collect-acquire-preserve,
understand, report, and close. This taxonomy is essentially consistent
with the taxonomies used by the IETF, NIST, and FIRST (Mundie et al.,
2014).
However, where a NIST standard such as SP 800-61 is a single 70-page doc-
ument, the ISO incident response standards are each 10-15 pages of unique
content with 10-15 pages that are repeated in each document. Thus, the
five ISO documents combined are comparable in scope and detail to SP
800-61. However, unlike a NIST publication, the ISO documents do not
present a clear investigative goal among the options we have distinguished,
even within documents, let alone among them.
27043, for example, seems to unknowingly alternate between incident response
for fixing systems and analysis for providing evidence to a legal proceed-
ing. Within 27043 ISO/IEC (2015c), §8 reads like advice from CERT/CC
(Alberts et al., 2004), and §9 reads like advice from Casey (2010, ch. 2).
The shift is abrupt and without explanation. The shift includes a shift in
terminology and jargon for referring to essentially the same mental process
by the investigator. This oddity does not build confidence that the ISO
standards actually present a unified methodology for incident response as
a series of disconnected vignettes.
27041 does little to dispel this sense of disconnectedness. This ISO document
is disconnected from the other incident management documents in that
it focuses on the client-contractor relationship. The sense in which is a
process is validated is that “the work instruction fulfils the requirements
agreed with the client” (ISO/IEC, 2015a, p 9). 27041 ISO/IEC (2015a,
p 12-13) states an investigation composed of validated examinations “can
be considered to be validated” while defining a validated examination
as one mode up of validated processes. Assuming composability of valid
processes is a dangerous claim. Concurrent program verification has shown
such claims cannot be assumed and are challenging to prove (Milner, 1989;
O’Hearn, 2007); albeit the technical sense of “valid” is slightly different,
doubt in the ISO assumption seems warranted.
For these reasons, the ISO standards would struggle to function well as a unified
whole. There does not seem to be an overarching editorial guidance to assure
consistency or navigate conflicts. At best, if the reader already knows how
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to navigate the different, conflicting contexts, the ISO documents are useful
expressions of each area of concern. The level of detail is appropriate for ensuring
management ability to oversee a process, rather than to do the process itself.
Even the most specific documents (27037 and 27042), to which the other, more
general documents refer for details, are thin on anything that might help with
actual decision-making. ISO/IEC 27042 provides a basic distinction between
static and dynamic analysis of malware (it uses “live” for dynamic), but all
that is really provided are a few descriptions of what distinguishes static and
dynamic analysis. These descriptions do not provide information on how to
actually do either kind of analysis, or even common pitfalls or errors to avoid.
RFC 2196 is quite old, and its advice shows its age. The steps are in general
sound; however, they are from a time when it was reasonable to ask for
“all system events (audit records)” to be recorded and evaluated by the
investigator (Fraser, 1997, p 54). The text assumes that incident invest-
igators will know what to do with these events once logged. This advice
is not bad, such as it is; however it is best understood as historical rather
than actionable advice.
RFC 6545 and RFC 6546 jointly detail Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID).
RFC 6545 describes conceptual and formal details, whereas RFC 6546
provides technical communication and encryption details. RFC 6545 is
an extension of IODEF (Danyliw, 2016), specifying methods and norms of
communication using IODEF between organizations. As such, the docu-
ment focuses on what to report, and how to use reports for mitigation.
Policy of use and sensitivity of information is explicitly integrated into the
format. How analysis produces adequate data is out of scope. However,
by providing such explicit standards on what should be reported and how
those reports can expect to be used, RID does put constraints on analysis
and evidence collection – those phases need to produce reporting with the
specified types of fields.
RFC 7203 extends IODEF (Danyliw, 2016) “to embed and convey various types
of structured information” Takahashi et al. (2014, p 2). Specifically, the
various metrics and formats such as CVSS and CVE captured in Table 7.
This extension serves to integrate two types of reporting format and con-
straint. This is useful, but is mostly programmatic. Therefore, it is not
directly about reporting in the same way RFC 7970 is. Although technic-
ally detailed, from a decision-making point of view RFC 7203 just suggests
that these metrics are useful ways to describe an incident and report on it,
and that investigators should do so. RFC 5901 makes similar suggestions
specifically for reporting phishing (Cain and Jevans, 2010).
RFC 7970 is the heart of the IETF incident analysis standardization effort. It
obsoletes RFC 5070, which is cited or used by most publication venues
as the incident reporting format. The focus is on exchanging indicat-
ors of incidents for collective defense. Although IODEF is, strictly speak-
ing, just an XML schema for document incidents, the available options
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and the ontology provided to constrain the other phases up to report-
ing. For some fields, this provides only minimal collection requirements.
However, consider the system impact type attribute, which is a required
field. There are 24 options specified, ranging from “takeover-account” to
“integrity-hardware” (Danyliw, 2016, p 46). Individuating among these
various impacts would require a relatively sophisticated incident response
and analysis capability; it is not so easy as logging an IP address and
passing it along. Just within the assessment class, one of two dozen over-
arching classes, there are five types of impact to distinguish between with
similar detail: system, business, time, money, and confidence. Such detail
provides the most rigorous reporting requirements and guidance available.
RFC 8134 is informational, and not a standard. It provides a list of inform-
ation exchanges, collaborations, and implementations that make use of
IODEF. Because information exchanges are a source of evidence collec-
tion, the details about what information is available from what groups
provides evidence collection suggestions and introductions. Although this
advice at a rather abstract level, it is useful because it provides a dis-
cussion of network defense information sharing arrangements that is not
commonly quite so public.
Gorzelak et al. (2011) is a study commissioned by ENISA and executed by
the Polish CERT. The focus is on data sources – how do CSIRTs monitor
their constituents. The method employed is a survey of over 100 CSIRTs.
While this data is at best instructive of where to get data, it is an im-
portant resource for how respondents evaluate the quality of data sources.
Such evaluation is directly relevant to evidence collection decisions. It is
unlikely this study is instructive outside this relatively narrow context.
However, it is directly relevant context for this work.
Alberts et al. (2004) is primarily about contextualizing incident management
within a wider organizational context. In fact, Alberts et al. (2004, pp 24-
26) is one of the best assessments of the relationship of investigation to
preparation and protection we have found in this review. However, our
focus is not on situation of the investigative process within an organiza-
tion. Alberts et al. (2004, p 128ff.) is an ambitious effort to organize a
flow chart for incident response. Because their scope includes technical,
management, and legal responses, the level of detail devoted to analysis
amounts to “Designated personnel analyze each event and plan, coordin-
ate, and execute the appropriate technical response” (Alberts et al., 2004,
p 136).
Kossakowski et al. (1999, p 17ff.) provides classes of advice, like collect
logs and isolate infected machines from the network. These perhaps come
the closest to advice about how to collect evidence from computer incid-
ents. However, it is silent on which logs to collect, or what to look for
when examining network traces. While this advice is highly likely to be
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able to generalize to all cases of incident response, the level of detail is not
operationalizable as a decision-making instructions.
Mundie et al. (2014) is, in effect, a literature review of incident manage-
ment. As such, it mostly constrains the inputs and outputs one would ex-
pect from incident response. The formalism provided is in a specification
of an OWL ontology language of incident management. This language is
a useful step in reconciling various incident management processes. How-
ever, it is simply a few levels of abstraction above our current task.
Osorno et al. (2011) has done something similar to our project here, in that
they inventory various incident management processes, with two main dif-
ferences. They focus on moving up a level to inter-organizational coordin-
ation during complicated incidents, rather than zooming in on individual
analyst decision-making. Osorno et al. (2011) also focuses on the US con-
text. This different purpose leads to substantial differences in emphasis
as to what is reviewed; for example, where we have generally set aside
data exchange formats (see Section 5.5.1), Osorno et al. (2011) spend con-
siderable effort mapping these formats into each other. For this reason,
the extent of their recommendation on incident response amounts to do
an OODA-style loop, a military term standing for observe, orient, decide,
and act (Osorno et al., 2011, p 7).
Hutchins et al. (2011) discusses courses of action for network defense. How-
ever, these are not direct advice on incident investigation steps. The level
of advice is on the order of “to disrupt installation events, use anti-virus.”
This advice is sound, but it is not particularly concrete.
Caltagirone et al. (2013) provides some light formalization of their qual-
itative categories into both graph theory and subject probabilities and
Bayesian statistics. We call this perfunctory formalization because the ex-
tent of their documentation is to list the formal structures that are equally
well-described by their prose. The document does not make any use of
the formalism, and it is not central to their arguments. The structures
appear to be constructed adequately; it is simply that any application of
them is left as an exercise for the reader in much the same way as if they
were not there.
Heuer (1999) is an instructive case for some advice being too broad for our
purposes. The book is comprised of explicit decision-making instructions
for analysis of intelligence. However, the level of abstraction is so broad
that it can be argued to be applicable to almost any adversarial decision-
making environment. So while it is valuable, and it provides instructions
for avoiding cognitive biases, it does not provide instructions at the level
of detail that are directly useful for an investigation.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014b, ch. 5) is about how to think like your ad-
versary. It is an extended treatment of developing and evaluating ad-
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versary action plans across multiple dimensions under constrained re-
sources. The basic cycle is to identify objectives, enumerate courses of
action, evaluate and rank the likelihood of following each action, and
identify necessary intelligence collection requirements to determine ad-
versary decisions. The document is about military intelligence operations
generally, not computer-security incidents. However, one narrow but ne-
cessary aspect of any investigation is how to anticipate an adversary. This
document covers the thought process behind the topic of anticipation in
a way which should be easily applicable to computer security.
Casey (2010, ch. 2) is built around the claim that digital forensics is just an-
other kind of scientific investigation. The basic ontology of the scientific
method is represented as simply create and evaluate hypotheses dispas-
sionately based on evidence. This description is supported by several
case studies as examples working through the method. This pedagogical
strategy does not quite amount to what we call advice on decision mak-
ing, but it is also more than merely an ontology. The end of the chapter
also includes advice on how to report conclusions convincingly to a jury
or prosecuting attorney. The advice is simple, but direct and effective: be
concise, let the evidence speak for itself, do not jump to conclusions, sum-
marize key results up front. The target audience is law enforcement who
will be using information technology to support general legal cases, not
computer crimes. Despite this broad audience, the treatment of decision-
making as part of the scientific method allows for easy and broad re-
purposing for other scenarios more directly related to computer-security
incidents.
Mitropoulos et al. (2006) is relevant to our project for its series of small
case studies on how to analyze different types of network logs. First,
they provide a flow chart of analysis of a IDS logs, intended to serve
as an example of analysis of a particular kind of technical information.
Although only represented at a relatively abstract level, this is directly a
representation of reasoning and decision making during incident response.
They also provide basic instructions on how to gather intelligence data on
adversaries using various network protocols. While we have ranked this as
unlikely to generalize, it is also very specifically targeted to techniques that
are commonly useful during incident response. So it is not particularly
necessary that they are generalizable. These sorts of cases are difficult
to teach and capture in a more abstract form, and are inflexible, and so
this specificity does come with a cost. Another important difficulty is that
Mitropoulos et al. (2006) do not advise in which scenarios to employ these
different types of forensic techniques.
Carrier and Spafford (2004) describes a evidence collection and hypothesis
testing and reporting model of digital forensic investigation. They use
forensic in its formal legal sense, and so target specifically the gathering
of adequate legal evidence. Their treatment of analysis is particularly
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brief, and roll it into part of the evidence collection process as simply
a determination of if the data element is relevant to the defined target.
As to target definition, it “is the most challenging of the search phase”
and is done “from either experience or existing evidence” (Carrier and
Spafford, 2004, p 8). Like the other documents, this one sidesteps most of
the actually hard work on which we would like to focus as essentially out
of their scope.
Ciardhua´in (2004) attempts a novel formalization by incorporating inform-
ation flow; although not cited, this is a term likely taken from Barwise
and Seligman (1997). However, the application to forensic investigation
(Ciardhua´in, 2004, p 21) bears little resemblance to formal information
flow models. The discussion places vague constraints on evidence report-
ing such as “the investigators must construct a hypothesis of what oc-
curred” and “The hypothesis must be presented to persons other than the
investigators” (Ciardhua´in, 2004, p 7). But in practice these are of little
use in making decisions during an investigation.
Leigland and Krings (2004) provides a formal specification of evidence col-
lection methods that can be adapted to specific operating systems. The
language associates collection goals with certain common attack patterns.
The goal is narrowly practical – to speed collection of evidence by techni-
cians during an investigation while reducing superfluous data collection to
make analysis a bit easier. The language maps general actions to specific
operating-system commands. The technician needs to specify file iden-
tifiers for specific attack campaigns; I expect the main downfall of this
method is that adversaries learned to randomize certain identifiers within
their attacks. Such randomization makes keeping an adequate library of
definitions for this language as defined essentially impossible.
6.2 Note on case studies
Case studies or collections of cases that have been analyzed by others provide
demonstrations of what sort of attacks are possible. We have two of the earliest
examples of this style of reporting with Stoll (1988) and Cheswick (1992). It is
important to note these are examples. A survey of incident case studies may
be a useful additional project, though it is out of our scope. The practition-
ers who wrote these standards documents would be aware that many security
vendors publish accounts of adversaries they have tracked in the course of their
work. These are of varying quality, scope and importance. More recent im-
pactful studies include, for example, Mandiant tracking an alleged unit of the
Chinese military (Mandiant, 2013) and Google’s self-report of comprise attrib-
uted to China (Drummond, 2010). Some case reports are official government
commissioned, such as the Black Tulip report analyzing the compromise of a
TLS certificate authority critical to the operation of many Dutch government
websites (Hoogstraaten, 2012).
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The scope need not be an individual case. Some studies focus on trends
rather than individual cases. Verizon’s Data Breach Investigation Report is
probably the best-known example (see, e.g., Verizon (2015, 2016)). United
States federal civilian agencies must make annual breach reports to Congress
per FISMA requirements; such detailed reports have been examined for trends
(Pang and Tanriverdi, 2017).
One notably change in this style of report since Stoll (1988) and Cheswick
(1992) is a trend away from discussing how exactly the investigators found what
they found. In an environment where adversaries are likely to read any reports
their targets publish, this shift towards withholding information is understand-
able. Paradoxically, this makes the old case studies more valuable, as they
remain some of the better expressions of the investigator’s thought process. Of
course, the tools and networks the old case studies discuss are almost entirely
irrelevant, which can make them hard to apply to today’s systems. And the
case studies do not do any of the work to make the necessary generalizations.
Through our survey, we find many of the modern expressions of the form of in-
cident response cycles are quite consistent with the mental process Stoll (1988)
and Cheswick (1992) describe.
7 Conclusion
Our review of the incident analysis literature indicates a gap specifically around
decision-making. There is adequate advice at a management level and a tech-
nical operational instructions level. But no adequate advice was found for de-
cisions at a middle-level of granularity; specifically, gaps of note are:
• strategic selection of tactics, that is, which analysis heuristic or technical
tool to employ in a particular situation and why
• when the investigator is justified in generalizing; that is, making a stronger,
broader claim from singular pieces of evidence
• what information to report and how to communicate it in order to convince
someone that the investigator should be believed
These problems are similar to those that scientists face in conducting their
research. Incident responders have quite different operating environments that
most scientists. However, as argued by Spring et al. (2017), there is no obvious
barrier to considering security research as a type of science. Scientific methods
and norms need to be adapted, as security poses certain novel challenges. How-
ever, as argued by Spring and Illari (2018), security analysts already take an
approach to generalizing knowledge that is both similar to and can benefit from
the wider literature on scientific explanation in philosophy of science. Therefore,
it is plausible that incident response would benefit from answering these gaps
with methodology adapted from philosophy of science, though it is unlikely to
be a panacea.
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Various other disciplines might contribute to filling these decision-making
gaps. Reviews of such other fields are future work. Note that none such arose
through our review of incident response standards. This gap indicates a reti-
cence to take on scientific tools. The exception is the intelligence community,
which genuinely integrates psychology and behavior economics (Heuer, 1999)
and to some extent Bayesian belief propagation (Caltagirone et al., 2013). Other
fields that might naturally be interrogated for links to incident analysis in fu-
ture work include game theory, decision theory, information theory, systems
engineering, internet measurement, and risk assessment. As one example, game
theory and network security already have a developed overlap, for example see
Alpcan and Bas¸ar (2011), which might be adaptable to incident response.
However, we are not aware of any work that has attempted to formalize
decision-making in incident response specifically. We leave this as an area of
future work. The work by Horneman (2017), adapting Heuer (1999) to computer
network analysis, is the closest approach so far. However, when our review calls
for more structure to decision-making, it would mean further structure and
specification of what she identifies as “analytical acumen” and its use.
Finally, we would like to note that this lack of published standards for this
granularity of decision-making does not mean that all incident responders are
ignorant or hopeless. Incident analysis is trade-craft, essentially handed down
by apprenticeship. Much more likely, various norms of reasoning through the
three gaps we note have been developed and disseminated amongst small groups
of analysts. Getting access to and surveying these analysts and their reason-
ing methods would also be a rich area for future work, though it is fraught
with difficulties of gaining trust, access, time, and representative samples. The
abundance of incident response teams, and the general social importance of re-
sponding to computer security incidents, has perhaps made this trade-craft ap-
proach unsustainable. The unsustainable nature of such trade-craft approaches
heavily influences our conviction that it is time to consolidate decision-making
in incident analysis and begin publicly filling in these gaps.
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